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ABSTRACT. The current, unprecedented rate of human development is causing major damages to Earth’s life-support systems.
Therefore, the need for transitions toward sustainability in the use of natural resources and ecosystems has been extensively advocated.
To be successful, such transitions must be guided by a sound understanding of the architecture of the policy and institutional designs
of both the process of change and the target outcome. Here, we contribute to current research on the institutional conditions necessary
for successful transitions toward sustainability in social-ecological systems, addressing two interrelated theoretic-analytical questions
through an in-depth case study focused in the Doñana region (Guadalquivir estuary, southwest Spain). First, we focus on the need for
enhanced historical causal explanations of social-ecological systems stuck in maladaptive rigidity traps at present. Second, we focus
on the explanatory potential of several factors for shaping maladaptive outcomes, at two different levels of analysis: political-economic
interests, prevailing discourses and power, at a contextual level, and institutional entrepreneurship, at an endogenous level. In particular,
we address that explanatory potential when the core logic of path dependence fails to predict maladaptive outcomes in a historical,
evolutionary perspective. When this occurs, such outcomes are often qualified as unexpected, hence subject to contingency, because of
their divergence from purported superior, optimal alternatives. We argue that contingency can be modulated away from randomness
and better characterized as unpredictability, through the systematic inclusion of the mentioned factors into analysis. This would, in
turn, increase our capacity to inform future policy and institutional transitional designs toward sustainability.
Key Words: adaptive inference; discourse analysis; institutional path dependence; maladaptive traps; modulating contingency; politicized
IAD framework; power; sustainability transitions
INTRODUCTION
The increasing extent and impact of human activities is causing
habitat and biodiversity loss, land degradation, environmental
pollution, and the depletion of many natural resources (Dirzo
and Raven 2003, Steffen et al. 2004, MEA 2005, Butchart et al.
2010). As a consequence, ecological and resource systems are
increasingly shifting toward undesirable alternative states less
suited to maintain human welfare (Rockström et al. 2009,
Biermann et al. 2012). Therefore, the need to facilitate the
transition toward sustainability has been extensively advocated
by the policy making and scientific communities (see, e.g.,
Brundtland Report 1987, Raskin et al. 2002, Loorbach and
Rotmans 2006, Levin and Clark 2010, Haberl et al. 2011, Markard
et al. 2012, Moore and Tjornbo 2012). In general, successful
sustainability transitions require a sound understanding of the
governance, the policy, and the institutional architecture needed
for both the process of change and the target outcome (Loorbach
and Rotmans 2006, Olsson et al. 2008, Young 2010, Markard et
al. 2012).  
We explore a set of interrelated theoretic-analytical questions
about the institutional conditions necessary for successful
sustainability transitions in social-ecological systems (SES). At a
general level, we are interested in the need for enhanced historical,
causal explanations for the genesis and evolution of SES stuck in
maladaptive traps (Holling et al. 2002), in particular rigidity traps
(see, e.g., Beier 2011, Herrfahrdt-Pähle and Pahl-Wostl 2012,
Méndez et al. 2012). Maladaptive traps are departures from the
adaptive cycle heuristic posed by resilience theory to characterize,
in conceptual terms, event dynamics, structural change, and
causality in SES as they evolve through time (Holling et al. 2002).
In SES stuck in rigidity traps, there is a historical tendency to a
mutual reinforcement of power, politics, and profit, and to the
recurrent use of command-and-control approaches for
governance and management. In the long run, those approaches
have been found to (1) hinder change, smother innovation, and
squeeze out diversity, (2) diminish ecosystems’ resilience, thus
increasing their vulnerability, and (3) promote socioeconomic
dependence on limited sets of resources (Gunderson et al. 1995,
Holling and Meffe 1996, Holling et al. 2002).  
More specifically, we are interested in the explanatory potential
of the following factors for the historical formation of rigidity
traps in SES, at two different levels of analysis: political-economic
interests, prevailing discourses, and power at a contextual level
(see, e.g., Pritchard and Sanderson 2002, Armitage 2007, Smith
and Stirling 2010, Voß and Bornemann 2011, Moore and Tjornbo
2012, Clement and Amezaga 2013) and institutional
entrepreneurship at an endogenous level (see, e.g., Westley et al.
2013, McCarthy et al. 2014). We will discuss the explanatory
potential of those factors when the core logic of path dependence,
composed by the mainstream principles of neoclassical
economics, fails to predict observed outcomes in a historical,
evolutionary perspective. When this occurs, such outcomes are
often qualified as unexpected because of their divergence from
purported superior, optimal alternatives, hence subject to
contingency. Here, based on an epistemological paradox created
by the notion of contingency, we make the case for the orderly
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inclusion of the mentioned factors into the analysis, so as to
increase our capacity to predict the likelihood of certain types of
maladaptive outcomes in SES.  
We address these theoretic-analytical questions through an in-
depth case study design focused on the Doñana region
(Guadalquivir Estuary, southwest Spain; Fig. 1), an estuarine SES
affected by intricate socioeconomic, water resources, and wetland
conservation problems. To guide the analysis, we use a recent
extension made to the Institutional Analysis and Development
framework (Kiser and Ostrom 1982, Ostrom 2005), which has
produced a politicized version (Clement 2010, Clement and
Amezaga 2013).
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
The research presented here followed from previous work
published in Méndez et al. (2012), and it is part of a long-term
program of social-ecological research focused in the Doñana
region. The program follows an iterative process (Fig. 2) of
theoretical evaluation against empirical information with both
scientific and normative goals. The process is guided by an
adaptive inference procedure (Holling and Allen 2002) and
operationalized through a methodological approach consisting
of three main components: (1) an in-depth single-case study
design (Yin 2009); (2) the politicized version of the Institutional
Analysis and Development framework; (3) a reasoned elaboration
of theory subject to thorough assessment.
Case study design
The research iteration presented in this paper (2nd research
iteration in Fig. 2) builds on a previous iteration focused on the
historical explanatory pattern underlying Doñana’s (Fig. 1)
current institutional regime (1st research iteration in Fig. 2;
Méndez et al. 2012). Méndez et al. (2012) concluded that the
Doñana region is currently governed by a rigid institutional
regime and stuck in a systemic maladaptive “rigidity trap”
(Holling et al. 2002), highly dysfunctional for coping with social-
ecological crises and unable to harmonize wetland conservation,
water management, and economic development (see also Gómez-
Baggethun and Kelemen 2008, Martín-López et al. 2011, Palomo
et al. 2011 for similar interpretations). The historical analysis of
Méndez et al. (2012) suggested that the institutional regime
followed a path-dependent dynamic characterized by the
historical persistence of command-and-control policy panaceas.
In a seeming paradox, command-and-control approaches failed
to drive the region toward an (optimal) efficient outcome, leading
it instead to system-wide inefficiencies and a rigidified outcome
(Doñana outcome hereafter). Méndez et al. (2012) assessed the
Doñana outcome as unexpected or, more generally, as contingent
against the efficiency and productivity baseline of neoclassical
economics that lies at the core of the theory of path dependence.  
In the second iteration, we re-examine, challenge, and refine the
historical explanatory pattern described above. We aim at
exploring how to increase predictability or, as we call it, how to
modulate contingency in the maladaptive Doñana outcome, by
taking a richer array of causal factors into the analysis. To make
our case, we have further developed two key conceptualizations
from Méndez et al. (2012): (1) path dependence, by revisiting an
extensive literature review drawing from economic history,
historical sociology, historical institutionalism, and political
science in a somewhat disciplinary phylogenic fashion; (2) the
notion of contingency, by emphasizing the epistemological
paradox that it creates at the core of path dependence theory. To
attain a proper balance in our case study between its capacity to
provide novel empirical insights and its power to assess effectively
our theoretic-analytical questions, we focused on a well-bounded
unit of analysis: the institutional events and actors of the
transformational process of Doñana’s floodplain marshlands
into irrigated and rice agriculture, all mainly fed by surface water,
as part of the right bank of the Guadalquivir estuary (Fig. 1). We
thus simplified the case by excluding historical and institutional
events and actors from other processes and geographical scales
that, as we already knew from Méndez et al. (2012), do not
influence nor confound significantly the factors and phenomena
studied in the selected unit of analysis.
The politicized Institutional Analysis and Development
framework
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework
is a systematic method for understanding how institutions operate
and change over time (Kiser and Ostrom 1982, Ostrom 2005). It
categorizes relevant explanatory factors and locates them within
a foundational structure of logical relationships that allows for
their analysis, as a prelude to understand how they are interrelated
and shape outcomes (McGinnis 2011). For greater detail on the
original IAD and how it applies to our overall research program,
see Appendix 1. Here we focus on how the politicized version of
the IAD (pIAD; Clement 2010, Clement and Amezaga 2013)
contributed to make us aware about the explanatory potential of
(1) discourses and their relationship with institutions and power
at a contextual level of analysis, and (2) institutional
entrepreneurship at an endogenous level of analysis. Whereas the
former were introduced into the analysis a priori, the latter was
introduced in hindsight.
Contextual factors: discourses and their relationship with
institutions and power
The pIAD enhances the capabilities for institutional analysis of
the IAD by integrating the political-economic context, discourses,
and power into the analysis, and placing them in a historical
perspective (Fig. 3). As originally devised, the pIAD envisages
discourses as constitutive elements of institutions, owing to their
capacity to reinforce or undermine their credibility, i.e., to confer
power to institutions (Clement 2010). Because discourses have
actors’ values and beliefs built-in, they hold a capacity to mobilize
power, thus acting as drivers of policy and institutional dynamics
(Clement 2010, Clement and Amezaga 2013). In turn, such
dynamics are shaped by the political-economic context and the
pre-existing institutional practices in which they are embedded,
in a dynamic two-way interaction (Clement 2010, Clement and
Amezaga 2013). In fact, discourses are posed as holding a capacity
for illuminating explanations about institutional dynamics, e.g.,
mechanisms at work, answering of “how” questions (Hajer and
Versteeg 2005). In sum, discourses are linked to institutions not
only by affecting their formation, but because “the emergence and
persistence of discourses depend on the institutional and
political-economic context” (Clement 2010:140, based on Hajer
1995). Philosophically, the pIAD adopts a post-structuralist
approach to power, by combining Lukes’ (2005) third-view and
Foucault’s (1979) conceptions of power (Clement 2010, see also
Clement and Amezaga 2013).  
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Fig. 1. Geographical location of the Doñana region. Source: our own development from POTAD (2003),
Castells et al. (1992; Almonte-Marismas Plan boundaries), and Gómez-Baggethun et al. (2012; broader Doñana
social-ecological system boundaries).
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Fig. 2. Iterative process, methodological approach, and adaptive inference procedure of our social-ecological
research program in Doñana, Spain. IAD framework = Institutional Analysis and Development framework;
pIAD = politicized version of the IAD. Source: modified from Holling and Allen (2002).
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Fig. 3. The politicized version of the Institutional Analysis and Development framework. Source: modified from
Clement (2010) and Clement and Amezaga (2013).
Taking those conceptions into account, we ground our analysis
on a wide structuralist and post-structuralist linguistic philosophy
to discourse and power analysis. Our chosen epistemological
orientation conceives human’s access to reality as largely mediated
by discourse (as language) to create representations that are both
reflections of such reality and contributions to its creation
(Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). From that point of departure, we
define discourses as homogeneous and organized regularities of
categorizations and concepts conveying ideas, knowledge, or
meaning about objects from the world, which actors exchange
through oral or written interactive means (based on Adger et al.
2001, Hajer and Versteeg 2005, Clement 2010). Our definition
emphasizes a twofold property of discourses: (1) they are
homogeneous and overarching patterns of thought and language-
in-use that contain the ideas, knowledge, or meaning of actors
about certain world phenomena, as well as about the causality of
problems and adequate responses to them, e.g., through certain
courses of action and practices; (2) they are dynamically conveyed
by actors, thus contributing to the production and reproduction
of objects and subjects in the world. Discourses exert power
because they transport the base knowledge that founds the
individual and collective action that shapes reality (Jäger and
Maier 2009).  
We focus on the influence, over our unit of analysis, of a
hegemonic, top-down discourse conveying ideas about political
and socioeconomic regeneration of the fatherland (the so-called
“regenerationism” movement), which emerged in Spain by the
end of the 19th century. We narrowed down the focus to that
discourse for several reasons: (1) we had gathered substantial
evidence about its potential contribution to Doñana’s
maladaptive state (Méndez et al. 2012), but our ideas about how
it contributed to such state remained untested; (2) its study
constituted a self-contained research iteration worth developing
to extract relevant research and normative lessons and insights;
(3) our research design did not exclude future research analyzing,
through the pIAD, the explanatory contribution of other
discourses, sources of power, and actors’ interests, at the same or
at a reduced level of analysis.
Endogenous factor: institutional entrepreneurship
Whereas contextual factors were introduced a priori in the
research, institutional entrepreneurship was introduced in
hindsight, upon realizing that our analysis was still insufficient to
provide a satisfactory refinement to the explanation about the
Doñana outcome. The historical operation of several seemingly
illogical infrastructure and biophysical processes, raised critical
concerns about how and why certain actors proceeded to action
at operational levels, in spite of large failures and huge
uncertainties in either expected outputs or the benefits to be
obtained from those processes. The IAD and, by extension, the
pIAD, provide the foundations for an analysis of how actors
consider and integrate mistakes of the past, for example, by setting
norms and rules, or by effective learning driven by negative
feedback, i.e., actors as fallible and adaptive learners vs fully
informed and rational maximizers (Ostrom 2005). However, those
frameworks lack a component allowing the analysis of how
adaptive learning is actually operationalized in situations
characterized by high uncertainty on the effect of human action
upon real-world SES, i.e., the effect of collective action at the
IAD-defined operational level upon the biophysical system (see
Appendix 1). To enable that analysis in a complementary way to
the pIAD, we drew from advancements in the literature showing
how institutional entrepreneurs have a great competency to
transform SES in situations of high uncertainty, through social
and environmental innovation processes by, for example, working
to (1) change beliefs “by convening all stakeholders around a
common vision”; (2) diversifying “the flow of political authority
and resources ... by playing key roles in networks and mobilizing
social capital”; or (3) challenging “technical and legal frameworks
... by encouraging integration of local knowledge, experimentation,
and new scientific frameworks” (Westley et al. 2013).
Theoretical elaboration
We base this research on our particular synthesis of path
dependence and the notion of contingency that lies at its core,
creating an epistemological paradox. Our elaboration is based on
an extensive literature review, from which we provide working
definitions (see below), a graphical depiction (Fig. 4) and a fully
referenced report (Appendix 1). In this section, we present
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Fig. 4. Graphical idealization of the concept of path dependence and the epistemological paradox created by the
notion of contingency at its core (based on Mahoney 2000), departing from the concept of path independence.
For simplification purposes, process/outcome dynamics have been depicted using sinusoids.
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theoretical content about the use of path dependence in the study
of institutional dynamics, as well as about the role of politics,
ideas, and power.
Path dependence
Path dependence (Fig. 4) challenges the assumption made by
neoclassical theory that technological and economic action
always move toward increasingly efficient outcomes, i.e., solutions
or designs. Inefficient outputs are envisaged as transitory
phenomena and notions of dynamics are restricted to movements
toward a highly abstract, invariant general equilibrium. Negative-
feedback mechanisms, e.g., decreasing returns, competitive
pressures, or price signals, offset major changes and lead the
setting, in a linear fashion, toward the predicted optimal
equilibrium. Outcomes are path independent, i.e., they are
predetermined and independent of how the initial conditions and
the history of technological or economic development unfolded
over past time. Hence, the role of history and evolution can be
disregarded. Institutions are envisaged as arrangements
exogenous to the technological or economic process; their
development is driven by a constant, rational search for efficiency
by actors seeking to improve their individual welfare, thereby
arriving at mutually beneficial, collective outcomes.  
Path dependence theory poses, in contrast, that institutions may
become locked in alternative, suboptimal outcomes that diverge
from optimal and more efficient, “superior” alternatives. These
outcomes depend on the initial conditions and how the history
of technological or economic development unfolds over time.
Seemingly small, random events can have unexpected,
disproportionate effects on the process, i.e., nonlinearity, making
it unfold in a stochastic fashion. The probability of occurrence
of the suboptimal outcome increases at each step of the process
owing to increasing returns, whereby decisions by actors favoring
certain choices, e.g., technology, increase the attractiveness of
these choices for other actors, in terms of pay-off  or utility.
Underlying increasing returns, there are self-reinforcing
mechanisms: positive feedback mechanisms that result in self-
reinforcing patterns, e.g., learning and coordination effects. In
path dependence studies, these outcomes and processes are
assessed as random, unexpected, or, more generally, as subject to
contingency, assessed against neoclassical economics principles.
This qualification creates an epistemological paradox.
Contingency: an epistemological paradox
We are concerned with a specific epistemological tension between
two senses of contingency in path dependence as established by
Mahoney (2000), which we have depicted in Figure 4. The key of
the paradox lies in that explanations about the end of the process
and lock-in phase rely on the same, negative feedback mechanisms
associated with neoclassical theory (e.g., constant or decreasing
returns), which are contradicted by what is occurring at initial
conditions (e.g., randomness, unpredicted or illogical behavior)
and beginning of self-reinforcement phase (e.g., increasing
returns), i.e., by actual events or behaviors. In the institutional
realm, this focus on neoclassical economics (in particular, on its
utilitarian core) results in a failure to theorize different
mechanisms to explain institutional dynamics (Mahoney 2000).
The two significations identified by Mahoney are two attributes
representing two extremes of contingency, respectively referring
to pure randomness or chance, and pure predictability (after Eagle
2005; Fig. 4). Between both, a continuum of predictability
unfolds, with randomness equating a high level of
unpredictability. Events or behaviors that are considered random
or unexpected under certain epistemological devices might be
explicable or predictable by alternative devices; hence,
randomness might be more properly assessed as unpredictability,
at least to some degree. In other words, the outcome under analysis
can be assessed as contingent by certain theoretical notions, yet
be consistent with the expectations of alternative theories positing
causal links accounting for such outcome. Hence the following
questions: Can we modulate contingency away from randomness
and assess it as unpredictability in path dependence studies? Can
we thus turn certain outcomes into more predictable objects by
using more comprehensive epistemological devices such as, in our
case, the politicized IAD framework?
Path dependence in studies of institutions
North (1990, 1991) generalized path dependence as a core concept
in explanations of institutional differences between diverse social
and economic systems showing an unexpected stability in spite of
a history of poor economic performance. He argued that
institutions are subject to the same self-reinforcing mechanisms
as technological and economic processes, in particular, to what
he terms as “massive increasing returns” (North 1990:94-95).
However, contrary to Arthur’s (1988) views, North considers the
latter as a necessary but not sufficient condition for path
dependence. For him, the lock-in of suboptimal outcomes prevails
regardless of the efficiency of alternative institutional
configurations because of other conditions such as the prohibitive
transaction costs of switching or reversal, the imperfection of the
market, and the limited rationality of the actors (North 1990).  
Here, we understand self-reinforcing mechanisms underlying
increasing returns as the “set of mechanisms endogenous to a
given path that makes it more and more dominant over time
relative to alternative paths” (Vergne and Durand 2010:755). They
include: (1) large setup or fixed costs, which create a high pay-off
for further investment in an already established single option; (2)
learning effects, if  knowledge gained in the recursive operation
over the resource system or ecosystem lead actors to be more
efficient and get higher returns from continuing use; (3)
coordination effects, if  the individual benefit increases as others
adopt the same option; (4) adaptive expectations, whereby
increased prevalence of selected options enhances beliefs of
further prevalence (adapted from Arthur 1988, North 1990).
Nevertheless, certain incomplete analogies must be made explicit
when path dependence concepts are transported across
disciplinary levels (Woerdman 2004). In this research, we apply
the analogy to increasing returns made by Woerdman (2004),
based on North’s insight. That analogy, which Woerdman (2004)
argues as incomplete, is made from technology and economics to
institutions, as follows. Economic increasing returns imply that
the production costs of a technology declines as fixed costs are
spread over an increasing production volume. For institutions the
analogy is not an increased production of institutions, e.g., rules
or legislation, but the decreasing costs of adding them as “the
institutional scale increases” (Woerdman 2004:61), as well as the
increasing potential benefits that this phenomenon signals to
lower level actors.
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The role of politics, power, and ideas
The above advancements were then applied in political science
(e.g., Pierson 2000a) and historical sociology (e.g., Mahoney
2000). In those fields, because of the existence of actor
constellations, the core logic of path dependence in technology
and economy constitutes only the utilitarian argument of the
discussion, there being other mechanisms bearing explanatory
power, namely, asymmetric power relations, functional logics,
legitimacy claims, the accumulation of mutual commitments,
the complex compound of inherited institutions, and the
significance of collective action (Mahoney 2000, Pierson 2000a,
b). From the standpoint of political science, institutional
dynamics are not just determined by mere rational responses to
a series of inefficiencies that are seen as transitory, but also by
political struggles over different interests and distributions of
power. For Pierson (2000b), political actors, seeking to reinforce
their authority and power, might favor and induce further
movement along a particular path by influencing public policies
and institutions. In contrast to the view of institutional
conditions in an inertial state of irreversibility, the political view
of path dependence emphasizes more how present and future
possibilities of change are the residue of a richer set of past
alternatives at the initial conditions stage, most of which are no
longer available (Pierson 2000b). Institutional dynamics are
envisaged as restricted and change as bounded by mechanisms,
e.g., counter-reactions, grinding down other mechanisms that
would otherwise lead to reproduction and continuity (Pierson
2000b). Power asymmetries inherited from past institutions
result, in practice, in an array of opportunities and constraints
influencing the nature of governance and the calculation of
rulers (Lewis 2007).  
For some, increasing returns “do not happen automatically,” but
most often must “be cultivated by actors” (Deeg 2001:12). That
happens through the mobilization of power and ideas that
promote their interests and mediate institutional change or
stabilization, e.g., mobilization in the political arena on behalf
of policy or regulatory change, organization of collective action,
coalition building (Deeg 2001). Utilitarian mechanisms such as
increasing returns may get exhausted and be replaced by power
mechanisms (e.g., coercive measures, state-enforced monopolies,
delegated enforcement powers), activated by dominant actors to
reproduce institutions so as to retain their positions, i.e., to
maintain the status quo. Eventually, the advent of decreasing
returns may force dominant actors to arrange new institutional
configurations (Schwartz 2004, unpublished manuscript, http://
www.people.virginia.edu/~hms2f/Path.pdf), triggering, if  not,
path changes without any obvious exogenous cause (Deeg 2001).
In fact, some have argued that political conflict, especially those
over ideas and underlying political/institutional assumptions, do
have a primary role in explanations of institutional dynamics
(Peters et al. 2005). More generally, it is argued that institutional
dynamics require a theory of ideology accounting for deviations
from the predictions of neoclassical economics, e.g., altruistic
behavior, obedience, and inefficiencies, in which context, culture,
and ideas are not uncritically reduced to simply how information
is distributed and used (Fine 2000). North (1991:98) stresses the
existence of choice points along the path, at which actors have
the opportunity to mobilize in support of a preferred choice,
therefore loosening the automaticity of path dependence
development. Indeed, more than three decades ago, North
argued that assumptions of economic rationality in neoclassical
economics cannot account for certain phenomena (North 1981)
and turned to the development of a theory integrative of the role
of ideology in institutional dynamics and economic change (North
2005).  
We seek to contribute to the development of such an integrative
theory within the SES and resilience thinking fields. This research
iteration tackles that contribution through the qualitative analysis
of discourses understood as conveyers of ideas, knowledge, and
meaning, and being both a constitutive power of institutional
dynamics and amenable for empirical analysis to illuminate
explanations about such dynamics. We also seek to contribute to
the mentioned fields with regard to path dependence more
generally, by means of our above conceptualizations, which are
both core to its pivotal usage (see Boonstra and de Boer 2014 for
a similar approach) and complementary to other approaches, e.g.,
path dependence resulting from output institutional inertia
(Österblom et al. 2011) or as a result of social-ecological memory
(Nykvist and von Heland 2014).
Operationalizing the analysis
The historical pattern developed by Méndez et al. (2012) was built
into a systems narrative. Here, data analysis, inference, and
theorizing are approached through a careful narrative (re)
construction. We progressed in several stages of data collection
and data analysis, interpretation, back and forth in a recursive
process (Fig. 2). This allowed us to gain a progressive
familiarization with the collected information, while looking for
evidence and patterns that matched or mismatched the theoretical
propositions and assumptions under evaluation (Yin 2009). Our
information sources consisted of an enriched (though admittedly
partial) version of the historical profile of Méndez et al. (2012)
and, for discourse analysis, of primary and secondary document
sources including research articles and books, technical reports,
and policy and legislative documents. The enriched historical
profile can be found in Appendix 2 (Table A2.1), and the discursive
data in Table 1.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To guide the reader through our explanations in the present
theoretical iteration, which refines the Méndez et al. (2012)
historical pattern, we provide a synthesis of key institutional events
and actors from the mentioned pattern (see Fig. 5 and the short
narratives provided in Appendix 3). To concretize our theoretical
elaboration, we relied on the comprehensive definition of path
dependence as “a property of a stochastic process which obtains
under two conditions (contingency and self-reinforcement) and
causes lock-in in the absence of exogenous shock” (Vergne and
Durand 2010:741). Applying it to the historical pattern’s
component parts, we specified the phases analyzed in the present
research, which take root in a “critical juncture” explained by
Méndez et al. (2012; Fig. 5, t1; not analyzed here). In particular,
we specified two phases posterior to that critical juncture, and for
reasons that will become evident below, were characterized as
increasing-returns phase (up to 1937, Fig. 5, t1A - t2A) and self-
reinforcement phase (1937–1980s; Fig. 5, t2A - t3A).
Setting the scene for the outcome
In general, the transformational process between the initial
conditions and 1980 (Fig. 5, point 1; Appendix 3, link 1) yielded
a large-scale implementation of technologies and engineering
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Table 1. Main attributes of the hydraulic-irrigation regenerationist discourse.
 
Attribute Description†
Roots Enlightened reformism and liberalism of the previous two centuries. Examples: program for agrarian development proposed by J.
Costa to the High Chamber of the Upper Aragón (1892-1893); Enlightened Plan of Promotion of the Province of Sanlúcar de
Barrameda (Cádiz 1805).
Political-
economic context
Fin-de-siècle Agrarian Crisis: readjustment of global agricultural trade, loss of overseas colonies triggering increases in tariff
barriers for traditional unirrigated crops (cereals, vineyards, and olive groves).
Disenchantment with the poor results obtained by past liberalist, laissez-faire hydraulic policies using various incentives (subsidies,
economic aids, and fiscal exemptions) to foster the private sector as the main driver in the building of primary hydraulic
infrastructure.
Huge public drive toward infrastructure development (roads, railways, and hydraulic infrastructure) through new types of subsidies,
economic aids, and fiscal exemptions, aimed at incentivizing the coparticipation of the private sector, for example, in the irrigation
business, i.e., toward the material reconstruction of the country.
Chronic budgetary crisis and contemporary deficit of government finances following the Cuban War.
Main expressive
means
Media (newspapers, e.g., El Imparcial), official documents (planning documents, e.g., National Plans of Hydraulic Works(,
legislation, e.g., Gasset Act, Cambó Act); institutional (speeches, e.g., before the Parliament, in agricultural organisations).
Features Irrigation agriculture (intensive and industrial) as a privileged means for economic modernization throughout the country, focusing
on modernization and increased production, thus avoiding the alternative option of land reform and redistribution to reduce the
rampant inequality between laborers and land owners.
Ideas about the need to maximize water use efficiency, inherited by the anterior period of Liberal Reform and forwarded as the key
for the consolidation of the liberal state.
Hydraulic policy as a reconstructive economic policy. North-south hydrological differences conceived as a geographical imbalance
(topographic and climatic), whose resolution would, in turn, resolve the ancient Spanish agrarian problem and the “ills afflicting
the fatherland” (from the Spanish los males de la patria).
The need for the state to build and exploit primary hydraulic infrastructure was “common sense doctrine,” based on the argument
that costly public investments constituted reproductive spending.
Representative characters: Rafael Torres Campos, Ricardo Macías Picavea, Fermín Caballero, Lucas Mallada, Andrés Llauradó,
Horacio Bentabol, Pedro M. González Quijano, Celedonio Rodrigañez, Joaquín Costa, Rafael Gasset, Lorenzo Pardo.
Illustrative
discursive
fragments
“It is urgent to rebuild the geography of the country, in order to resolve the political and social matters” (Costa 1911).
“Current social and agricultural progress in Spain depends on rainwater, and water springs and reservoirs. Such water must be the
task of the nation, and the agricultural Congress must address both the Parliament and the Government for their urgent claim, as
the supreme desideratum of Spanish agriculture” (Costa 1911).
“...[T]he day that all the water of the Pyrenees remains in the plain, our province alone will produce as much as ten provinces
together, and there will be for all, income and luxury for the rich, independence and well-provided table for the poor, high and
uninterrupted wages for workers, substantial alms to the destitute, large payments to the treasury, rest and comfort for all...” (Costa
1911).
“Canals and reservoirs must be built by the State; if  built by the private sector, the remedy would be worse than the disease” (Costa
1911).
“...government must be willing to take charge, as a function of the State, the building of canals and reservoirs, for which it will
present, within a year, a bill for a general Plan aiming at such purpose” (Gasset 1899, as cited in Sánchez 1997:324).
Key conceptions
and dichotomies
Water of rivers is lost to the sea, hydrological differences constitute a geographical imbalance (topographic and climatic), existence
of “two Spains” (wet North and dry South), two types of basins (ones negatively balanced and others positively balanced), need for
hydro-solidarity among regions.
†Sources: own elaboration based on the primary and secondary sources consulted. Main secondary sources include, e.g., Ortí (1984), Moral-Ituarte
(1991), Gómez-Mendoza (1992), Sánchez (1997), Fernández (2000).
works on the ground aimed at reducing the natural variation in
the Guadalquivir estuary and its floodplain marshlands,
including Doñana’s hydro-ecological system (see Table A2.1,
Appendix 2 for evidence). This sought to decrease natural
complexity and uncertainty, in order to maximize agricultural
production, inland water shipping, and return on investment over
the short term. Although the second half  of the 20th century
witnessed large agricultural transformations and the emergence
of a highly productive, technically efficient rice sector, the whole
process signals a high contingency (Fig. 5) against the static
principles of neoclassical economics based on two encompassing
grounds:  
1. Early failures: The majority of the first agricultural attempts
along the increasing-returns phase (Fig. 5, t1A - t2A)
repetitively ended in productivity, infrastructural or
financial failures (Table A2.1). A priori, this might indicate
either that informational, negative feedback mechanisms
did not operate efficiently at any point to make actors react
and readjust their approaches in subsequent enterprises, or
that actors were subject to random, irrational behavior. 
2. Illogical decisions: The full development of rice and
irrigation agriculture in the Guadalquivir marshlands at
both banks of the estuary along the self-reinforcement phase
(Fig. 5, t2A - t3A), appears as illogical for several reasons that
we shall develop below. 
Regarding rice agriculture, the unfavorable biophysical features
of the estuary and the marshlands create severe salinity and water
supply problems, posing economic barriers that proved difficult
to overcome (based on Enggass 1968, Grande-Covián 1977,
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Fig. 5. Synthesis of Méndez et al. (2012) historical explanatory pattern, including information about key
institutional events, actors, and transformations on the ground. TM1 specifies the periods established in Méndez
et al. (2012); TM2 specifies the time markers resulting from the explanatory refinement presented here, based on
the definition of path dependence of Vergne and Durand (2010). IR = increasing returns; SR = self-
reinforcement.
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Corominas 1995, Santamaría et al. 1996, Blomquist et al. 2005,
González-Arteaga 2005, Parry et al. 2012):  
. The strongly seasonal temperature and rainfall regime,
characteristic of a subhumid Mediterranean climate, cause
within-year flow deficiencies for irrigation, and multiyear
droughts that exacerbate such water deficits. 
. The moderate-high, NW-SE salinity gradient results in salt
deposits and thick saline crusts (in the upland and the
lowland soils, respectively) during summer. This occurs in
synergy with the high imperviousness of the soils and with
the horizontality of the marshlands, which prevent the
regular washout of salts and fine elements. 
. The low slope of the last stretch of the estuary and the
geomorphology of the single-channel mouth of the river,
which combine to allow (i) the tidal ebb to penetrate up to
90–100 km inland; (ii) a greater penetration of the salinity
wedge, whose length, concentration, and movements
depends on the oscillations of both daily tides and seasonal
freshwater. 
From the short-term-maximization standpoint of neoclassical
economics, these biophysical features combined to make the
economic development based on agricultural transformation of
the self-reinforcement phase a counterintuitive endeavor, for the
following reasons. First, although the topographical and climatic
conditions of the marshlands potentially matched the needs of
several crops, rice was the most adapted alternative to the harsh
saline conditions (Sumpsi 1980, Moral-Ituarte 1993, Portero et
al. 2007, Muñoz 2009). Choosing the optimal crop was, however,
a long-term lesson learned after a prolonged process of
speculation and experimentation, whose recurrent, negative
outcomes did not fit well with neoclassical logic.  
Second, rice agriculture was in full operation by the 1980s-1990s
and, being one of the most technically advanced sectors in the
world, its cultivation was already well adapted to the territory and
generating significant agronomic yield and economic gain in an
arguable regime of constant returns to scale. Indeed, Sumpsi
(1980) argues that maximum profitability of rice production was
reached between 1948 and 1955, and then started to decline until
a minimum level was reached by the end of the 1960s. Moral-
Ituarte (1991) documented a structural saturation, from the 1960s
onward, in the hydraulic intervention at the level of the
Guadalquivir River basin, caused by an increased awareness of
an emerging imbalance between water supply and demand. Today,
rice cultivation occupies approximately 34,900 ha, equivalent to
35% of the marshlands (Portero et al. 2007). By the 1990s-2000s,
it constituted the livelihood of more than 6000 families and
yielded between 262,000 and 342,000 tonne per year (TPY) in
normal rainfall years. This meant, in unit yields, about 7.5–10
TPY/ha, doubling the average global yield and constituting 10–
15% of EU’s production (based on Castroviejo 1993, Moral-
Ituarte 1993, Corominas 1995, González-Arteaga 2005, Portero
et al. 2007). However, the high salinity and the limited water
availability have recurrently challenged (and still does today) rice
agriculture viability and profitability from the outset. Rice, which
must be cultivated during spring-summer because of its mild
temperature requirements, needs huge freshwater resources to get
the optimum salinity level allowing for normal growth (< 0.8 g/L,
upper tolerance threshold 1.5–2 g/L; Corominas 1995, González-
Arteaga 2005, Muñoz 2009). Water demand, estimated nowadays
at a volume of 10,000–12,000 m³/ha (8000-9000 m³/ha if  recycling
processes are taken into account), has been traditionally met by
resources collected from the Guadalquivir River and the local
aquifer through pumping systems, complemented with urban
waste effluents, and managed through a complex and costly system
of sluice gates and canals (Castells et al. 1992, Moral-Ituarte 1993,
Portero 2001, Blomquist et al. 2005, Muñoz 2009). All this requires
a costly hydraulic infrastructure that collect and distribute water,
and, in the view of the époque engineers, transformed several
thousand hectares of “saline desert” into productive irrigated
croplands: “Reclaiming the land for cultivation would involve these
processes: preventing the inflow of outside waters, draining off  the
precipitation falling into the impoldered zone, and lowering the
ground-water table” (Grande-Covián 1960, as cited in Enggass
1968:128).  
Let’s therefore make the following counterfactual. What if  such
infrastructure had not been constructed by the 1950s, when the
growth of the rice sector commenced at a relevant rate? What if  a
large part of such infrastructure had not been publicly backed, e.
g., through top-down coercive changes in the property system,
public investments, strong legal and tax incentives (Table A2.1)? It
is hard to imagine that any idealized neoclassical actor at t2A (Fig.
5) would have made a rational decision toward any type of efficient
allocation of resources seeking the transformation of the
marshlands into agricultural land, hence a profitable investment:
(a) if  knowledgeable of the failures of the increasing-returns phase;
(b) in the absence of hydraulic infrastructure for irrigation and
salinity regulation. In fact, the transformational processes were
only possible owing to the intervention of the state in the double
role of undertaking key infrastructure development and
subsidizing large capitalist companies with high capacity for
technological development (Moral-Ituarte 1993, Ojeda-Rivera
and Moral-Ituarte 2004). Today, thorough calculations remain
undone, but rough estimates indicate that the total investment in
irrigation infrastructure undertaken by the Guadalquivir River
Authority between 1939 and 1987 came to 197,000 million Pesetas
(Moral-Ituarte 1991:512) or €1182 million (equivalent to more
than €43,808.5 million at present, using the 1961–2018 % change
in the general CPI = 3706.3%, Spanish National Institute of
Statistics, since there are no CPI data for years prior to 1961). In
addition, a neoclassical actor could not have envisioned a rice
sector highly competitive in the market, since, ceteris paribus, e.g.,
energy and water prices, market and surplus regulations, external
financial inputs such as subsidies, the Guadalquivir sector would
have been outcompeted by other regions not limited by water
availability. In fact, in pure market terms, the Guadalquivir rice
sector is arguably of limited overall economic efficiency outside
the European Union’s protectionist scheme (Castells et al. 1992,
Moral-Ituarte 1993, González-Arteaga 2005, Portero et al. 2007).  
Finally, the ensuing development of irrigation agriculture at the
right bank, with the support of FAO (Table A2.1), is also at odds
against the neoclassical baseline for two main reasons. First, the
experiences of the left-bank transformational process show that
the recovery of saline soils required a publicly funded, long-term
costly process of hydraulic drainage that considerably reduced the
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prospects for short-term economic profitability. Second, there was
a lack of (1) technical training and specialization among the local
farmers, hence the skills necessary to undertake a high-risk
intensive agriculture very different from rice growing; (2) financial
and commercialization structure and capacity to optimize the
benefits from the crops and related agricultural products. This
eventually contributed to a deep economic crisis in the 1990s that
made it necessary for the intervention of the Andalusian regional
government (Rubio-Recio 1977, 1993, Castells et al. 1992,
Corominas 1995). The total cost of the drainage system through
canals, underground pipes, and water pumps to enable irrigation
agriculture is still uncertain, but by the 1990s it was argued that
any economic assessment would have resulted in a negative
balance (Rubio-Recio 1993). In fact, the World Bank provided a
negative evaluation of the economic viability of the project as
early as 1962 (Rubio-Recio 1993). Calculations made in 1992
estimated the total costs of the transformation (15,000 ha) at
55,000 million Pesetas, the private family debt at more than 2300
million Pesetas, and the economic viability plan to overcome crisis
at 1500–1700 million Pesetas (amounting, respectively, to
€12,231.8, €511.5, and €333.6–€378.0 million at present; Castells
et al. 1992, Castroviejo 1993).  
In sum, the transformational process and the outcome in Doñana
can be assessed as unexpected and, more generally, as contingent,
for it defies the universalistic principles of neoclassical economics.
The latter cannot account for the transformational process
described by the historical pattern, at least not in isolation. We
now turn to the task of working out the why and how that
transformation happened. Our more specific questions are the
following: (1) Was the process that led to the Doñana outcome
triggered by irrational, unexpected, or random events and
behaviors, or was it unpredictable because of an incomplete
analytical framework? In other words, can such outcome be
predicted using a more complete framework? (2) What is the
explanatory potential of political-economic interests, discourses,
and power as factors contributing to shape the Doñana outcome?
Refining Doñana’s historical pattern: steps toward modulating
contingency
Here we discuss three sets of mechanisms that reduce the
unpredictability associated to the Doñana’s rigid outcome. Some
elements of the first two sets are described in detail in the historical
pattern developed by Méndez et al. (2012). We focus on their
explanatory potential by arguing how the three sets have operated
over time, and by justifying their necessity and sufficiency as
conditions for the emergence of the outcome (see Table A2.1 for
the evidence).
Increasing returns
Massive increasing returns were signaled from the constitutional-
level institutional matrix, throughout Doñana’s whole
transformational process (Fig. 5, point 2; Appendix 3, link 2).
Learning and coordination effects operated along the increasing-
returns and the self-reinforcement phases. Additionally, during
the self-reinforcement phase, large setup costs (once the first large
irrigation infrastructures were in place, in the early 1950s) and
adaptive expectations (once the rice sector started its full
development and entered the national and global market, in the
1960s-1970s) started to operate. It was then after 1937, when a
clear and systemic self-reinforcement pattern started to unfold,
that the Doñana region was pushed toward a certain trajectory.
And it was the realization of that dynamic that led us to
characterize the 1937–1980s period as a “self-reinforcement
phase,” different from the previous “increasing-returns phase.”
The latter, although also characterized by some of the self-
reinforcing mechanisms that underlie increasing returns, did not
show signs of a systemic self-reinforcement dynamic, at least not
one as difficult to reverse as the one that took place after 1937
because of massive increasing returns, large setup costs, and the
deep adaptive expectations pervading the collective-action level.  
Can these phenomena and behavior be qualified as irrational or
random? We argue against such characterization. Collective-
action actors were behaving neither randomly nor illogically, but
responded instead through positive feedback to the constitutional
institutional matrix, a higher structural entity. Borrowing from
David (2007), it is misleading to pose economic irrationality or
implementation errors in Doñana, because collective-action
actors were subjected to positive network externalities, e.g.,
coordination effects. They were, if  something, picking “the right
horse,” based on their expectations and projections on how the
future was to unfold. Hence, they adapted their actions “in ways
that help make those expectations come true,” having and
following adaptive expectations (Arthur 1994:112). They were
responding to the driving force of incentives, which, in the words
of North (1990:112), constitutes one of “the most constructive
building blocks of neoclassical theory.”  
However, this set of mechanisms constituted a necessary but not
sufficient condition for the emergence of the outcome. Although
our results agree with the insight that increasing returns can result
in alternative, far-from-equilibrium paths (if  an equilibrium does
exist at all), its selection may also result from the occurrence of
externalities and other mechanisms decreasing the likelihood of
such paths or the attractiveness of other alternatives (Arrow 2000,
Kay 2005, Vergne and Durand 2010).
Politics, discourses, and power
The historical pattern describes several top-down, political and
power mechanisms at the constitutional level that played a key
role in decreasing the attractiveness of alternative courses of
action during the self-reinforcement phase (Fig. 5, point 3;
Appendix 3, link 3). Together with the bottom-up (increasing
returns) mechanisms described in the previous section, these top-
down mechanisms contributed to reduce the unpredictability
associated to the rigid outcome. However, the notion of
contingency continues to be very powerful, for it still signals a
bizarre historical process, especially along the self-reinforcement
phase. The arguments derived from the historical pattern that (1)
collective-action actors were inefficiently allocating resources in
response to speculative expectations on massive increasing returns
produced by the institutional framework, and (2) constitutional-
level actors were reproducing command-and-control for the sake
of power and economic maximization logic, are not satisfactory
in isolation. It is striking that command-and-control continued
to pervade the institutional framework, and that the large-scale
transformational process started and progressed on the ground,
in spite of negative feedbacks signaling broad operational
inefficiencies and of other policy and institutional alternatives
with significant socioeconomic potential at the self-reinforcement
phase, e.g., the costs and consequences of doing nothing; the
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preservation and empowerment of traditional economic and
ecological knowledge; the promotion of nature conservation,
scientific research, and nature tourism.  
At this point, observing the constitutional-level institutional
events and actors’ behavior through the lenses of the pIAD, we
realized that another crucial factor was playing a major causal
role in the determination of the outcome. It prompted, in
particular, a strong command-and-control institutional logic in
Doñana. We refer to a discursive factor related with
“regenerationism,” an intellectual movement that emerged in the
19th–20th change of century, aimed at explaining objectively the
decline of Spain as a global economic and political power. It
operated at different institutional levels in diverse sectors like
politics, economic policy, science, and education. We were
especially interested in its effect over the Doñana region because
it conveyed the idea of irrigation agriculture and hydraulic
infrastructure as a panacea for economic prosperity (see also
Swyngedouw 1999). We shall refer to that discourse as the
“hydraulic-irrigation regenerationist discourse” (HIR discourse
hereafter; see its main features in Table 1).  
During the Restoration period (1874–1931), the HIR discourse
was absorbed at a political level owing to decisive actions taken
by the Civil Engineering Corps and by Rafael Gasset, who was
several times minister of public works. They intensively promoted
the main arguments of Joaquín Costa, the key ideologist of the
hydraulic-irrigation paradigm, in both the media and the
Parliament (Ortí 1984, Díaz-Marta 1989, Gómez-Mendoza 1992,
Sánchez 1997, Mateu 2002). This contributed to a progressive
shift of the state from a mere subsidiary of hydraulic
infrastructure, to the active promotion and implementation of
such a type of infrastructure (Table A2.1). This shift formed part
of a more general, long-term plan that consisted of three broad
political-economic stages: (1) a period of material reconstruction
of the country through the construction of primary
infrastructure, e.g., roads, railways, hydraulic infrastructure, led
by the state and financed through the emission of public-debt
instruments; (2) a period of settlement of the debt that was being
generated by the emission of such instruments; (3) progressive
inhibition of the state from economic life (Sánchez 1997).
However, implementations on the ground were very limited.
During the 1920s, until 1933, just about 12% of the planned
primary infrastructure and irrigated land surface had been carried
out, funded through the emission of public debt instruments
justified as investments with long-term returns based on taxable
income (see Sánchez 1997, Fernández 2000). During this period,
the overtly liberal HIR discourse played mainly a rhetorical role
and utopian unifying symbol based on powerful logics (logos) and
capacity to appeal to emotion (pathos; Table 1). During the II
Republic (1931–1939), there were reformist attempts at the
agrarian level, but the National Plan of Hydraulic Works
(NPHW) of 1933 inherited the hydraulic character and
regenerationist mark of the Water Act of 1879 (repealed more
than one century afterward, in 1985), the Restoration’s NPHW
of 1902, and the subsequent revisions of the latter (Ortega 1984,
Moral-Ituarte 1991, Gil 2001). During Franco’s dictatorship
(1939–1975), the largely technical NPHW of 1933 was fully
implemented through the (almost identical) NPHW of 1940
(Table A2.1). Franco’s government abandoned the agrarian
reformist aspects of the 1933 plan, but undertook the major
hydraulic transformations of the 20th century (Table A2.1).  
Three radical institutional changes took place at this point in time.
First, at the constitutional, strategic level, was the interventionist
character of both the Irrigation Act of 1932 and the NPHW of
1933, inherited by the NPHW of 1940. The state financially
assumed, in full, the construction of primary and secondary
irrigation hydraulic infrastructure, and took a main role in the
colonization-and-development strategies (Sánchez 1997, Gil
2001, Moral-Ituarte 1991, Barciela and López 2003). Second, at
an administrative level, there was the creation of the Water Union
Confederations (precursor of the modern Water Authorities),
semiautonomous organizations guaranteed financially by the
Ministry of Public Works, in 1926 (Table A2.1). They were
entrusted with the management and maximization of the
agricultural, forestry, and hydropower yield of water resources at
the basin level, bringing together the widest range of regional
stakeholders, but promoting the national interest to the detriment
of local ones (Sánchez 1997, Gil 2001). Third, at the ideological
level, there was an emphasis on the need to establish a hydrological
balance between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean basins,
based on the argument of the higher agricultural productivity and
economic potential of the former, and the lack of planned works
implemented in the latter (Ortega 1984, Gil 2001).  
In the Guadalquivir estuary, the HIR discourse started to exert
an effect in the 1920s, providing impetus to the first private
companies for transforming the Guadalquivir marshes into a
“new Nile delta” (Sabuco 1997:56; Table A2.1). The public and
private transformational attempts that took place during that
decade occurred under the protection of legislative (e.g., Cambó
Act) and incentivizing (e.g., financial and tax-reduction
instruments, direct transfer of property rights, no need to justify
investments) instruments charged with regenerationist ideas
(Table A2.1). In particular, they promoted the transformation of
an extensive typology of lands traditionally considered as
unhealthy and unproductive, such as lagoons, marshlands, and
wetlands. The largest regional transformations started during the
1940s, and reached their maximum impact during the 1960s and
the 1970s, under the protection of a battery of regulations deeply
rooted in history (Table A2.1). During these two decades, a
number of primary hydraulic infrastructures started or planned
in previous periods by the state, private companies, or the
Guadalquivir River Authority, were completed (Table A2.1). The
action of the latter, created in 1927, was crucial in two main senses:
ideologically, because of its mandate to maximize resource yield
(Moral-Ituarte 1991); operationally, because of its role in
regulating and streamlining irrigation activities all over the basin,
through reservoir control (Moral-Ituarte 1991), which has been
fundamental in the development of technically efficient rice
agriculture in Doñana. All these changes were protected
legislatively (e.g., Colonization of Large Areas Act of 1939) and
rooted in the acknowledgement, by the NPHW of 1933, that
regulation was crucial for the irrigation in the marshlands already
transformed for “sanitation and colonization” purposes (Pardo
1933:209).  
At this point of the analysis, however, these two broad bottom-
up (increasing-returns) and top-down (politics, power, and HIR
discourse) mechanisms appeared as still insufficient to provide a
satisfactory explanation about the Doñana outcome. The high
uncertainties posed by the water supply and salinity problems
elaborated above raised the following question: How and why did
collective-action actors proceed to transformation in spite of the
Ecology and Society 24(2): 30
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol24/iss2/art30/
huge uncertainty on either the output of the transformational
process or the benefits to be obtained from rice agriculture? We
argue that the dual entrepreneurial component analyzed in the
following section must be added up as a necessary endogenous
condition.
Dual entrepreneurship component
This component consists of two endogenous processes of
innovation. In the economic development realm, there is the
action of Rafael Beca and the Valencian rice growers. The first
was an experienced entrepreneur that managed to initiate the full
development of the rice sector in Doñana, which would eventually
end in a market-based economy. The Valencian rice growers
constituted a pioneering workforce attracted by Beca that
introduced crucial innovations and productive factors for rice
cultivation. In the nature conservation realm, there is the action
of a group of private actors led by J. A. Valverde, which was
successful in championing a potent nature conservation counter-
discourse locally reactive to the contemporary, intensive
socioeconomic development and agricultural transformations.
And this is how history went.  
Uninterrupted rice cultivation in the Guadalquivir marshlands
started in the midst of the Spanish Civil War. In 1937, Rafael Beca
was entrusted with the development of rice agriculture in Isla
Mayor by the Francoist faction, in order to ensure rice supplies,
because the main rice production centers were in hands of the
Republican faction (Sabuco 1997, González-Arteaga 2005). Beca
received political, financial, and technical support and carte
blanche from the recently established dictatorial regime, through
the Guadalquivir River Authority, and the National Institutes of
Colonization and Housing. From 1939 onward, a long-term
transformation process ensued characterized by (1) the state
traditional interventionist colonization-and-development strategy;
(2) a constant increase in both the number of rice growers and
cultivated surface that curbed in the 1960s-1970s (concentration
of land ownership); (3) a shift from an experimental period
(1940s) characterized by minimal use of technology, to a large-
scale process of increasing modernization, e.g., full
mechanization of direct sowing, use of enhanced seed varieties,
herbicides, combine harvesters, and rice drying techniques; (3)
sustained growth (1980s-1990s; Sumpsi 1980, Moral-Ituarte
1993, González-Arteaga 1993, 2005).  
First Valencian rice growers arrived in the 1940s. This workforce
was first attracted by an advantageous tenancy regime and the
promise of future ownership offered by Beca because he was aware
of the novel productive factors that they brought along with them,
amongst the most important being (1) a differential, intrinsic
belief  in the feasibility and economic profitability of rice
agriculture in the marshlands based on previous experiences,
which contrasted with the local history of extractive, subsistence
economy, and the associated skepticism toward any
transformational attempt (this belief  soon diffused among part
of the already established, mostly Andalusian, workforce); (2) the
importation of innovations and know-how from developments in
similar areas from their homeland, e.g., Valencia Coastal Lagoon,
which outcompeted other techniques imported in the past from
the Nile or the Ebro deltas to Doñana; (3) a rather novel, family-
based work culture oriented around rice growing, in which women
played a major role reconciling housework and farming tasks
(González-Arteaga 1993, 2005, Corominas 1995, Sabuco 1997,
Muñoz 2007).  
Finally, we have the innovative action of the group led by Valverde,
which eventually led to (1) a protection-for-conservation race for
the salvation of Doñana’s remnant marshland and wetland
ecosystems in the 1950s-60s; (2) the purchase, by the newly created
WWF, of crucial marshland areas, which entrenched the “battle”
against agriculture throughout the 1960s; (3) the creation of the
Doñana National Park in 1969 (currently embedded in the wider
Doñana Nature Reserve; see Fig. 2). For a more detailed
description of the process see Valverde (2004) or Méndez et al.
(2012).
Synthesizing the discussion
At the national level, the HIR discourse had an enormous
ideological power that originated during the 19th century and was
institutionalized along the Restoration period, independently of
the governing party, liberal or conservative (Fig. 6, point 1).
Afterward, the HIR discourse paved its way toward the ensuing
periods embedded in the institutional matrix at the legislative,
strategic, and operational levels (Fig. 6, point 2).  
In turn, the institutional matrix produced regularized
expectations and patterns of interaction among collective-action
actors, due to the increasing returns that it signaled downstream
of the constitutional level (Fig. 6, point 3). Such actors were
responding to opportunities and constraints that were socially
shaped, embedded in the institutional framework, and cognitively
powerful; i.e., they were not just merely responding to external
incentives of unknown origin. It can therefore be argued that
hydraulic development and the irrigationist culture would have
been improbable without the presence of a discourse deeply
structuring the consciousness and view of reality of all-level
actors (see also the views expressed by López-Gunn 2009, Moral-
Ituarte 2009, Paneque and Vargas 2015). This, in turn,
constrained their choices, practices, courses of action, and ways
of solving problems, and, to a great extent, legitimated the
institutions under development, thus limiting their possibilities
for transformative agency. Locally, borrowing from Schwartz
(2004, unpublished manuscript), the events and behaviors
occurring in Doñana during both the increasing-returns and self-
reinforcement phases, which neoclassical economics would assess
as random, irrational, or illogical, were in fact specific
manifestations of larger structural forces. The HIR discourse
favored the unfolding of the entrepreneurial component (Fig. 6,
point 4), allowing two contrasting processes: first, the innovative
action of Beca and the Valencian rice growers to take place, which,
in turn, facilitated the development of irrigation agriculture;
second, the (re)action of the group led by Valverde, aimed at
salvaging (the remains of) Doñana’s ecosystem from the ongoing
process of agricultural transformation.  
Given our arguments, can randomness be exhausted and the
contingency signal abated in Doñana? Do our results therefore
invalidate the path dependence hypothesis established by the
historical pattern (Méndez et al. 2012)? We argue not, for two
main reasons. First, within a complex SES, socioeconomic
processes lead to deep biophysical and ecological transformations
that are largely irreversible, giving rise to early lock-in situations
that are very persistent because of the high sunk costs generated,
thus eliminating feasible alternative paths at their roots, not to
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Fig. 6. Graphical depiction of the mechanisms that contributed to the emergence of the Doñana’s systemic rigid
outcome. HIR = hydraulic-irrigation regenerationist.
mention the high transaction costs involved in a potential process
of institutional and hydro-ecological change. Second, there is the
unpredictability associated with human agency, personified by
illustrative actors such as Beca, the Valencian rice growers, and
the group led by Valverde, whose presence and action in Doñana
is subject to a certain degree of randomness. Moreover, the timing
and sequence of the process triggered by Valverde’s group,
overlapping with the process of agricultural transformation, led
to the actual systemic rigidity trap in Doñana, instead of a much
more difficult-to-escape lock-in trap (Allison and Hobbs 2004)
that would be characterized by a deep erosion of environmental
and ecological values (Méndez et al. 2012). In other words, it led
to a clash of discourses and developments on the ground that was
arguably the result of a certain degree of random chance.
CONCLUSIONS
The present paper, in combination with the historical pattern of
the first theoretical iteration presented in Méndez et al. 2012, seeks
to round up a comprehensive story about a complex SES from
different disciplinary angles, considering a broad diversity of
influencing factors. In this second research iteration, based on
our results and discussion, we argue that three mechanisms were
necessary and sufficient conditions for the emergence of the
Doñana’s systemic rigid outcome: (1) a contextual political-
discursive mechanism that mobilized power top-down from the
constitutional level and signaled increasing returns to actors
downstream at the collective-action level; (2) the operation of
increasing returns and self-reinforcing mechanisms bottom-up;
(3) a dual endogenous institutional entrepreneurial component
that acted as a mechanism for action in an environment of extreme
uncertainty at the collective-action level. At a theoretical level,
our explanatory refinement of the Doñana region’s path-
dependent historical pattern has shown how its current
maladaptive state (rigidity trap) is more expected to occur if  a
more comprehensive analytical framework is used, in this case,
the pIAD. Our study of political, discursive, and power contextual
factors, and endogenous entrepreneurial components, has shown
how contingency might be turned into a property that can be
modulated. In that form, contingency can be used as an
instrument to help institutional analysts to avoid premature
assessments of historical events as proceeding by chance or
localized behavioral dynamics as subject to inherent randomness.
More generally, the use of enhanced epistemological devices can
warn analysts that upper, structural factors could be affecting
decision and action downstream into the local level negatively,
contributing to the emergence of undesirable systemic outcomes.
This means that our predictive power might be further enhanced
through systematic, comparative studies including contextual and
local variables or indicators addressing multilevel phenomena so
as to account for broader sets of outcomes. Thus, we might
increase our capacity to inform future policy and institutional,
transitional designs toward more sustainable outcomes in SES,
in a more comprehensive and interdisciplinary way.  
In these future designs, the discussion of optimality criteria in the
context of path dependence and neoclassical economics
principles should be made explicit, for two main reasons. On the
one hand, neoclassical economics principles obviate, by default,
the complex and uncertain dynamics of SES, as well as the role
of politics, discourses, and power in the determination of
efficiency and optimality standards. Unfortunately, such
principles are still uncritically mainstreamed in current policies
and institutional designs. On the other hand, path dependence
brings a built-in high heuristic power for normative purposes by
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raising concerns with the risk of lock-in of structural components,
e.g., technologies, institutions, ideas, paradigms. This is critical in
the presence, for example, of large set-up, sunk or transaction
costs, resulting in institutional inertia and the irreversibility of
changes made to SES biophysical conditions. An improved
understanding of current, seemingly random institutional or
ecological occurrences would entail the improvement of our
present scientific tools. More pragmatically, it would entail an
early awareness of behaviors or events that might signal the
imminent fall of a given SES into an undesirable outcome bearing
high opportunity costs, e.g., lock-in traps. In the Doñana case, we
wonder whether changes in the productive elements of discursive
factors, e.g., arguments or narratives, could trigger more profound
changes in institutional structures that facilitate a transition
toward a more adaptive and flexible paradigm, i.e., whether ideas
and discourses can contribute to change the institutional
architecture of the Doñana SES.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/10898
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Appendix 1. Definitions 
 
The Institutional Analysis and Development framework 
 
The original Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Kiser and Ostrom 1982, 
Ostrom 2005) focuses the analysis on the relationship among institutions, cultural attributes, 
biophysical conditions and human behavior and action (Fig. A1.1). Broadly speaking, within the IAD 
institutional arrangements are understood as “the rules used by individuals for determining who and 
what are included in decision situations, how information is structured, what actions can be taken and 
in what sequence, and how individual actions can will be aggregated into collective decisions”; 
institutions are thus “complex composites of rules, all of which exist in a language shared by some 
community of individuals rather than as the physical parts of some external environment” (Kiser and 
Ostrom 2000:56). Based on this approach, institutions are here operationally defined as: the human-
devised regular patterns of constraints or opportunities within which the choices, actions and 
interactions of actors (individual or organizational) take place and which shape the consequences of 
such choices, actions and interactions – in short, the formal and informal rules of the game (based 
on North 1990a, Ostrom 2005, McGinnis 2011). 
 
The focal level of analysis of the IAD is the ‘action arena’ (Fig. A1.1), defined here as the social 
space where: (1) policies or institutions are designed by ‘actors’ engaged in action situations1 
affected by the ‘biophysical conditions’ and by two social variables reflecting the most substantive 
part of a pre-existing institutional framework, namely, ‘rules-in-use’ and ‘attributes of the 
community’; (2) the patterns of interactions and decisions that take place within the action situations 
shape certain outcomes; (3) such outcomes feedback into the action arena and into the mentioned 
variables, and may change the institutional framework (Ostrom 2005, McGinnis 2011).  
 
 
Fig. A1.1. The Institutional Analysis and Development framework. Source: modified from McGinnis (2011) 
 
In sum, actors use institutional prescriptions to organize repetitive and structured interactions while 
participating in action situations within the action arenas. Institutions are considered as an exogenous 
variable of the arena, the other exogenous variables being the biophysical system being acted upon 
and the cultural attributes of the community. Regarding actors, the IAD depicts them as “fallible 
learners” (McGinnis 2011), i.e. as operating under uncertainty, and having limited cognitive and 
                                                 
1 According to McGinnis (2011:172), originally, “the action situation was enclosed within an action arena, which also 
included the set of actors as a separate component; however, since the capabilities of actions can be attributed to the effect 
of the position rules defined below, E. Ostrom (2010) recommends abandoning this distinction between action situation 
and arena”. Here, we keep the original formulation of the action arena, since it better addresses the systemic needs of the 
present research. In particular, it globally captures the diversity of combinations of rules, situations and actors that can 
emerge at the different levels of analysis defined by the IAD, namely: constitutional, collective-choice and operational. 
information-processing capability (bounded rationality), but as being able of learning from error 
(adaptive learning). This view of the actor, in particular, “bounded rationality” (Simon 1955), is 
reactive to the view of rationality as optimization of neoclassical economics. Finally, the IAD device 
poses a multi-layered hierarchical structure of three tiers for organizing institutional analysis, termed 
‘constitutional’, ‘collective choice’ and ‘operational’ (McGinnis 2011). These levels constitute a 
hierarchical, multi-level structure, in which each upper tier determines how institutions and decisions 
are made at the next, downward level. The lower levels can, in turn, exert an influence over the upper 
levels. The lowest, operational level directly affect state variables in the world (see e.g., Ostrom 
2005:59). 
 
In this research, the definition of institutions used (see main text) is applied to the variable ‘rules-in-
use’ of the IAD. ‘Actors’ are considered either as individuals acting on their own or as agents of 
‘organizations’. In turn, organizations constitute specific ensembles of individuals with common 
interests, values or beliefs whose formation respond to the institutional framework, or to other 
constraints or opportunities such as technology or biophysical conditions (based on North 1990a:73, 
see also North 1990b). We are here therefore differentiating between institutions (e.g., rules, norms) 
and organizations (e.g., research and management agencies; see also Ostrom 2005:179). With respect 
to the levels of analysis, the collective-choice and operational levels were combined into a single unit 
labelled ‘collective-action’ (see Fig A1.1. See also Fig. 1 in main text), conceptualized as the level 
directly affecting state variables of the ‘biophysical conditions’, in our case, Doñana’s hydro-
ecological system. This constituted an ad hoc artifact to simplify analysis and discussion, as well as 
future processes informing both normative transitional designs towards sustainability and future 
treatments of our unit of analysis in deeper institutional analyses. At a theoretic-analytical level, our 
research follows Ostrom’s (2005:28) prescription to differentiate between the use of theory and 
analytical frameworks. While the former causally link observed or modelled phenomena providing 
analysts with interpretive structure, the latter provides analysts with general sets of factors and 
relationships that must be considered in a diversity of institutional settings.  
 
The concept of path dependence 
 
Path dependence is used interchangeably as a theory, concept, model or heuristic in the literature. We 
use it here as a concept that is part of a broader theory, with potential use as both a heuristic and a 
model, at the discretion of the analyst. Contemporary work on path dependence is rooted in the works 
of Paul David (e.g., David 1985, 1994) and Brian Arthur (e.g., Arthur 1989, 1990) on the economic 
history of technology and on self-reinforcing economic processes, respectively. Broadly speaking, 
the concept challenges one of the main assumptions made by neoclassical theory namely: that 
technological and economic action always move towards optimal solutions or designs (i.e. outcomes) 
that are the most efficient in whatever type of function they are argued to fulfill –measured, for 
example, by Pareto optimality criteria. This assumption stems from the more general assumption that 
economic action is characterized ex ante by the existence of movements towards a hypothetical, static 
and invariant general equilibrium. The latter is demonstrated through highly abstract, simplified and 
idealized market models and solutions, looking at how changes in certain variables (e.g., market 
prices) affect the equilibrium of other quantities (e.g., other market prices). Inefficient conditions and 
outputs are envisaged as transitory phenomena, and notions of dynamics, are restricted to movements 
towards equilibrium, which, once reached, leads to stasis. According to this approach, the outcome is 
predetermined and independent of how the initial conditions and the history of technological or 
economic development unfolded over past time, i.e. it is path independent, and the role of history and 
evolution can be disregarded. The process is arguably complex and context specific, but economic 
action, in general, is assumed to be subject to certain negative-feedback mechanisms (e.g., decreasing 
returns, competitive pressures, price signals) that offset major changes by reaction and lead the 
setting, in a linear fashion, towards the predicted optimal equilibrium. Institutions are envisaged as 
arrangements exogenous to the technological or economic process and their development as driven 
by a constant, rational search for efficiency by actors seeking to improve their individual welfare, 
thereby arriving at mutually beneficial, collective outcomes.  
 
The studies on the path dependence of technologies and the economy constitute the core of a much 
more ample critique to the abstract, and rather normative, principles of neoclassical economics. 
According to this approach, in the absence of exogenous shocks, lock-in will occur on any alternative 
sub-optimal outcome that diverge from and select out optimal and more efficient, superior 
alternatives. The main assumption is that outcomes depend on how the initial conditions and the 
history of technological or economic development unfold over time, because a multiplicity of 
multiple-stable equilibria or attractors, defined by limiting probability distributions, exist at the end 
of the process. Optimal outcomes form part of the range of multiple attractors, but they are not 
predetermined, for the process is considered as non-ergodic and independent of the level of 
consciousness or rationality of the actors –which contrast to the insight of not predetermined optimal 
outcomes as a consequence of the non-existence of fully knowledgeable and rational actors in the 
‘real’ world. In general, it is argued that the beginning of the process is affected by seemingly small, 
random events that have an unexpected disproportionate effect on the process (i.e. non-linearity), 
making it unfold in a stochastic fashion. While in the equilibrium approach the assumed mechanisms 
decrease the probability of distancing from the predetermined optimal outcome, path dependence 
entails that the probability of occurrence of the sub-optimal outcome increases at each step of the 
process. This happens owing to ‘increasing returns’, which deal with the notion of how decisions by 
actors favoring certain choices (e.g. technology) directly or indirectly increase their attractiveness for 
other actors, in terms of pay-off or utility. Underlying increasing returns, there are ‘self-reinforcing 
mechanisms’, i.e. positive feedback mechanisms that result in a self-reinforcing pattern (e.g., learning 
and coordination effects). 
 
Sources consulted include: David (1985), Arthur (1989), Arthur (1990), Liebowitz and Margolis 
(1990), North (1990a), David (1994), Ikenberry (1994), Hacker (1998), Mahoney (2000), Pierson 
(2000a), Pierson (2000b), David (2007), Arias and Caballero (2003), Puffert (2004), Schwartz (2004), 
Woerdman (2004), Sydow et al. (2005), Page (2006), Lewis (2007), Boschma and Martin (2010), 
Vergne and Durand (2010), Dobusch and Schüßler (2012). 
 
Contingency: an epistemological paradox 
 
In this research, we are concerned with a specific epistemological tension between two senses of 
contingency, as established by Mahoney (2000:513): (1) the “inability of theory to predict or explain, 
either deterministically or probabilistically, the occurrence of a specific outcome”, hence a contingent 
event is “an occurrence that was not expected to take place, given certain theoretical understandings 
of how causal processes work”; (2) that some events or behaviors are part of a “non-systematic 
variation inherent in the world that cannot even in principle be eliminated from causal theories”. 
Generally speaking, any event, behavior or outcome at odds with analysis is assessed as contingent 
because it appears as either unforeseen by the set of general principles or propositions of the 
epistemological device at work (e.g., analytical framework, theory, model), or random phenomena of 
an inherently stochastic world (e.g., chance, freewill, agency, natural disasters). 
 
And herein lies the paradox. According to Mahoney (2000:516), the combination of the 
indeterminism characterizing contingency in the genetic phases (e.g., critical junctures) with the 
determinism of the mechanisms leading to the reproduction of the outcome in a self-reinforcing path-
dependent sequence, lead to a paradox, since such outcome simultaneously: (1) contradict the 
analytical framework at work; (2) is reproduced through mechanisms associated with the contradicted 
framework. Although Mahoney (2000) speaks generally about prevailing analytical frameworks and 
different disciplines, he exemplifies about the path dependence of technologies or the economic 
process and their organizations (e.g., QWERTY vs. Dvorak keyboards, mass vs. craft production). 
There, the outcome is assessed as contingent because it appears to contradict the principles of 
neoclassical economics. Broadly speaking, the efficiency of technologies, economies or institutions 
is called into question in an assessment against the principles of models portraying an ideal world in 
which optimality is achieved in a state of equilibrium. To make sense of the paradox, Mahoney 
argues, it must be recognized that (1) the outcome results contradictory when it is compared with past 
alternatives, which were viable at the earliest part of the path-dependent historical sequence and, from 
a neoclassical standpoint, seemed as more efficient and optimal choices; and (2) although a sub-
optimal, far-from-equilibrium and inefficient outcome is produced instead, such outcome is 
reproduced at present by neoclassical-theory mechanisms. In other words, the key of this seeming 
paradox lies in that explanations about the lock-in phase rely on the same, negative feedback 
mechanisms associated with neoclassical theory (e.g., constant or decreasing returns), which are 
contradicted by what is occurring at the initial (e.g., randomness, unpredicted or illogical behavior) 
and self-reinforcement (e.g., increasing returns) phases, i.e. by actual events or behaviors. In the 
institutional realm, this focus on neoclassical economics, in particular, on its utilitarian core, results 
in a failure to theorize different mechanisms explanatory of institutional dynamics (Mahoney 
2000:525-526). 
 
Here, we would like to emphasize a higher implication of this paradox at an epistemological level, 
with both theoretical and normative repercussions. The two significations identified by Mahoney are 
two attributes representing two extremes of contingency, one referring to pure randomness or chance, 
and another, to pure predictability (after Eagle 2005). Between both, a continuum of predictability 
unfolds, with randomness equating a high level of unpredictability. This approach neither preclude 
the existence of regularities in sequences of events with uncertain outcomes, nor exclude the 
possibility to describe certain outcome phenomena or evolution of events through probability 
distributions. Since events or behaviors that are observed as random or unexpected under certain 
epistemological devices might be straightforwardly explicable or predicted by alternative devices, 
randomness might reveal and be more properly assessed as unpredictability to some degree. In other 
words, that the outcome under analysis is assessed as contingent by certain theoretical notions, doesn’t 
mean that its emergence cannot be consistent with the expectations of alternative theories positing 
causal links accounting for such outcome.  
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Appendix 2. Historical profile 
Table A2.1. Historical profile – includes only the period comprised between 1870 and the 1990s (IR = 
increasing-returns, SR = self-reinforcement) 
Phase Period Date Institutional element (legislation, plan, organization) 
IR Restoration 
(1874-1931) 
1870a Royal Order, promoting drainage engineering projects at the Lebrija marshes (left-
bank). Most of the projects were finished in 1928, due to inadequate planning 
and the priority given to navigation policies 
1870 Canals and Reservoirs Act, granting perpetuity rights to large public-works 
companies on the use of infrastructures in which they had invested 
1877 Public Works Act, conceiving Hydraulic Plans as a centralization instrument, but 
also laying the foundations for sectoral and secondary legislation incentivizing 
the private initiative through the Concession/Contract of Public Works. Wetlands 
drainage perceived as a cleaning and public health task 
1877 Royal Order, granting the first large-scale drainage works at the Gallega marsh 
(Aznalcázar; failed and reinstated in 1910) and the marshes of Almonte (not 
executed), both at the right bank. Projects justified on agricultural development 
and the fight against the harmful effects of swampy areas 
1878 Royal Order (leprosy RO), wetlands as a source of disease and unhealthy areas 
1879 Water Act, giving priority to irrigation agriculture through public intervention, over 
navigation, at the State level – end of laissez-faire policies. Already marked by 
regenerationist ideas. Recognition of the principle of subsidiarity. Declaration of 
surface water as a public good. Distinction between continental (e.g., lakes, 
lagoons; public property) and coastal waters (e.g., marshes, marshy lands; 
private property).  Consideration of few options for water allocation, the most 
important being drinking water –“agua de boca”–, agricultural and industrial 
(agricultural mills and sawmills). Decision about the advisability of 
transformation entrusted to private owners, except when area declared unhealthy 
by public authorities, which subsequently incentivized transformation (e.g., 
subsidies, transfer of property or exploitation rights, fiscal exemptions) 
1880s Emergence of the hydraulic-irrigation regenerationist discourse (HIR discourse) 
1883 Irrigation Act (Gamazo Act), continuing the legislative trend of the Water Acts of 
1866 and 1879. Regenerationist 
1899 Draft of General Plan of Reservoirs and Irrigation Canals, precursor of the plan of 
1902. Backed by the Civil Engineering Corps 
1901 Creation of the Hydrologic-Forestry Service and the Hydraulic Works Divisions, 
precursors of the Water Authorities (1926). In charge of the elaboration of the 
plan of 1902 
1902 General Plan of Irrigation Canals and Reservoirs (GPICR, plan of Rafael Gasset, 
revised in 1909, 1916 –second Gasset plan–, 1919 and 1922, reducing 
substantially the initial plan in terms of total irrigable surface). Included novel 
knowledge about Spanish geography and hydrography, complemented the newly 
created Hydrologic-Forestry Service, and promoted State interventionism. 
Elaborated by a team of civil engineers, directed by Rafael Gasset (Ministry of 
Agriculture, Industry, Trade and Public Works), during more than two years, 
based upon more than 300 reports elaborated by the Hydraulic Works Divisions. 
Planning the conversion into irrigable lands of more than 1,460,000 ha (6% of 
the total Spanish territory, 296 hydraulics works listed as advisable). Despite its 
provisional character, it was in force until the creation of the Hydrographic 
Union Confederations (1926) 
  
Table A2.1 (continued) 
Phase Period Date Institutional element (legislation, plan, organization) 
IR Restoration 
(1874-1931) 
1907 Inner Colonization and Repopulation Act, halting emigration and promoting the 
cultivation of low-yield lands. Creation of the Institute of Social Reform 
1911 Irrigation of Large Areas Act (Gasset Act), establishing the State as the financer 
and promoter of large public works. Legislative protection of the plan of 1902. 
Synergy with the hydro-electric sector, which continued all along the 
dictatorship of Primo de Rivera and the II Republic. In 1912 there was an 
extension of aids for large irrigation infrastructures (e.g., special exemptions – 
“franquicias especiales”) 
1918 Act for the Drainage of Lagoons, Marshes and Marshy Areas (Cambó Act), 
authorizing the transformation of unproductive lands. Empowerment of 
regenerationist policies in the primary sector. Included an extensive typology of 
marshlands and wetlands. Minimum surface liable to be transformed: 100 ha. 
Large diversity of financial instruments, tax reductions and transfer rights for 
both public and private actors. Not mandatory to justify investments upon 
cleaning and purification purposes 
1921-
1937 
Several attempts by private companies, backed by international investment funds 
and authorized by regulations, to transform the marshes for farming and 
agricultural purposes, for example: Guadalquivir Marshes Company 
(Guadalquivir marshes, 1921); Guadalquivir Islands Company PLC vulgarly 
known as “the company of the Englishmen”, with English and Swiss capital (Isla 
Mayor, marshes of Aznalcázar and Isla Mínima, right bank, 1926); Company for 
the Valuation of the Marshes PLC with Argentinean capital (1932); Isla Mayor 
of Guadalquivir Company PLC (Gallega marsh, right bank, 1934) 
Attempts were mostly driven by speculation on the potential of the marshlands for 
agriculture and in some cases produced high yields, but ended in broad financial 
and technical failure due to: low profitability of crops in saline soils, fragmentary 
planning and lack of coordination, and underestimation of damages produced by 
seasonal natural flooding (e.g., construction of a superficial drainage system 
incapable of protect agricultural lands) and the harshness of the saline soils (e.g., 
failure to bring in enough water to effectively washout salts) 
1926 Creation of the Water Union Confederations, the modern water authorities 
1927 Creation of the Guadalquivir River Authority 
1929 General Plan of Public Works of the Guadalquivir Water Union Confederation, 
operative until the 1970s. Emphasis on the need to regulate and streamline 
irrigation activities all over the basin through reservoir control 
1930 Plan for the Expansion of Irrigation in the Low Guadalquivir (122,750 ha) 
IR 
 
 
 
II Republic 
(1931-1939) 
 
 
 
 
 
1932 Agrarian Reform Act, banning land owners from expelling land tenants from rented 
lands. Obligation to cultivate, in order to avoid confiscation. Creation of the 
Institute of Agrarian Reform 
1932 Irrigation Act, increasing the State responsibilities in the development of secondary 
and complementary public works, in order to realize the functioning of the areas 
already transformed into irrigable lands 
1933 National Plan of Hydraulic Works (plan of Lorenzo Pardo), authorized by the 
Irrigation Act of 1932. Elaborated by the General Directorate of Hydraulic 
Works, through the creation of a Centre for Hydrographic Studies. The main 
goal was the correction of the “hydrologic imbalance” of the Iberian Peninsula, 
with a focus on the south-western (“Levante”) territories, whose soils were 
considered to be productive enough to increase agricultural exports. The need for 
large water diversions (“trasvases”) became institutionalized 
Shift  
IR-SR 
Civil War 
(1936-1939) 
1937-
1939 
First small-scale successes in rice cultivation in “Isla Mayor” and “Isla Mínima” 
(right bank) by the company of Rafael Beca 
 
 
Table A2.1 (continued) 
Phase Period Date Institutional element (legislation, plan, organization) 
SR Dictatorship 
of Franco 
(1939-1975) 
1939-
1949 
Battery of regulations further protecting the traditional colonization-and-
development strategy of the state. 1939 – Colonization of Large Areas Act. 
Creation of the National Institute of Colonization. Drainage and transformation 
of wetlands planned and executed between the mentioned institute and private 
actors. Complemented in 1946 by the Local Colonizations of Interest and 
Forceful Expropriation of Rustic Property Act 
1939 National Plan of Hydraulic Works (plan of Alfonso Peña), operative until 1963. 
Synthesized the main principles of the plan of 1933. Complemented by the 
previous Colonization Act and by another providing aids for irrigation 
1940 Declaration of the Guadalquivir marshes as being of National Interest by the 
National Institute of Colonization. Socioeconomic orientation of the already 
polderized land (left bank) towards irrigated agriculture 
1940s First large-scale successes in rice cultivation by the company Rafael Beca & Co, 
Agricultural Industries PLC 
1940-
1951 
Construction of the Low Guadalquivir Canal, declared of National interest, in order 
to irrigate the left-bank marshes. Key in the washing of salts from the land, but 
of no practical use and considered as “dead”, at the time of construction, over a 
stretch beyond a point 80 km downstream of its beginning, owing to its 
malfunction in water transport and distribution. It currently forms part of the 
(more functional) irrigation system of the Low Guadalquivir area (left-bank 
marshes, 65,000 ha)  
1944-
1960s 
1944-1956 – Canalization and diversion, by Rafael Beca & Co, Agricultural 
Industries PLC, of two of the main channels inflowing into the right-bank 
marshes: Guadiamar channel, through the Entremuros canal (1km wide; Fig. 2, 
point A), and Brazo de la Torre (Fig. 2, point B). The former is currently 
connected to the second, a dead arm-river that drains to the Guadalquivir 
Estuary. Construction of about 100 km of dikes and drains. Protection of 20,000 
ha of pastures. The works were supported by the Guadalquivir River Authority 
and backed by the Gasset Act of 1911. In the 1960s, a dam transverse to 
Entremuros, towards El Rocío was constructed, which currently constitutes the 
northern limit of the Doñana Nature Reserve. Most of these works were executed 
by public contract and publicly funded 
1949 Colonization and Property Distribution of Irrigable Areas Act, prompting the 
transformation of vast areas. Transformation decided, financed and executed by 
the state. Continual of the Acts of 1939 and 1946 
1955 Declaration of the left-bank marshes of National Interest. 65,000 ha (33,000 ha of 
marshes; 32,000 ha of sands) 
1953 Improvable Estates Act, classifying large estates either into “improvable” or 
“model” farms. Classification into “improvable” farm required owners to carry 
out improvements on pain of compulsory acquisition by the government, in order 
to increase productivity and qualify such farms as “model” 
1960 Irrigation Plan of the Low Guadalquivir (55,000 ha). Construction of a drainage 
network in the North of Section III (left-bank) 
1965-
1971 
Guadalquivir-FAO Project, carried out by the Spanish Ministries of Industry, 
Agriculture and Public Works (IGME, IRYDA), with the technical and financial 
support of FAO. Discovery of an aquifer suitable for irrigation, located, in part, 
below the right-bank marshes of Almonte, Hinojos and Aznalcázar (5-14 m 
deep; 7,000 hm3). Backed by the FAO-Guadalquivir project and the experiences 
of the left-bank, realization of a second hydrological study affecting 23,589 ha, 
declared of National Interest in 1971. Of these, 6,132 ha were included in a plan 
for the transformation of the marshes of Almonte, Hinojos and Aznalcázar into 
irrigated agricultural land (Almonte-Marismas Plan) 
 
 
Table A2.1 (continued) 
Phase Period Date Institutional element (legislation, plan, organization) 
SR Transition to 
democracy 
(1975-1982) 
1983 Water Act, subordinating large water diversions to specific legislation and to future 
Hydrologic Plans, and creating the opportunity for an open water market. 
Inclusion of underground water in the Hydraulic Public Domain 
SR 1990s 1993 First draft of a Hydrologic Plan at the national level promoting a new ‘hydrological 
paradigm’ (water supply management) in the 1990s, which nevertheless waxed 
lyrical over the regenerationist dream of Joaquín Costa and kept a hydraulic mark 
in its promotion of large water diversions 
Sources: own elaboration based on the primary and secondary sources used in main text, and on the historical profile 
elaborated by Méndez et al. (2012). Other secondary sources included (see references below): Andrés-Gallego (1981), 
Bartolomé (2011), Bayán and Dolz (1995), Ceballos (2001), García and Marín (2006), Gil (2002), Liceras (1987), 
Rodríguez-Cárdenas (1994)  
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Appendix 3. Synthesis of the historical pattern 
 
This appendix includes a synthesis of the historical pattern in the form of links that connect with our 
arguments in Results and discussion from main text. For greater detail on the explanation and 
interpretation provided by the historical pattern please see Méndez et al. (2012). 
 
Link 1  
 
Prior to the 19th century, the Guadalquivir marshlands (140,000 ha) were characterized by a 
subsistence, pre-market economy organized around ancient property arrangements, and farming, 
fishing and hunting activities. Those activities were of marginal importance due to the constraints 
imposed by the harsh and inhospitable environment (e.g., strong flood seasonality, water scarcity for 
human uses, hard climate, soil salinity, unhealthy conditions and risk of malaria). The marshlands 
endured almost unmodified until the 1920s. However, the first meander cuts and bottom dredging in 
the estuary (1795-1816) for enhancing navigability and preventing hazardous floods, triggered (Fig. 
3, t0A) a multi-level process of policy, institutional and strategic change that eventually led to the 
intensive agricultural and floodplain developments of the second and last thirds of the 20th century. 
In a first phase (Fig. 3, t1A- t2A), the majority of changes occurred in policy and regulations at the 
constitutional level, and in strategic, property and organizational re-arrangements among actors at the 
collective-action level. During the 1920s and 1930s, until 1937, this process produced significant 
agronomic outputs in recurrent attempts by private initiatives, rather innovative for the time (Table 
A2.1, Appendix 2). In a second phase (Fig. 3, t2A- t3A), between 1937 and the 1980s, the process 
produced changes at multiple regime levels, the most significant being the massive transformation 
that took place on the ground, in three waves. On the one hand, two concurrent waves of land 
transformation took place in both the left and right banks of the estuary (1937-1980s): one led to the 
implementation and development of rice agriculture; and the other, which followed closely, led to the 
development of irrigation agriculture. On the other hand, an inward-outward protection-for-
conservation race of the Doñana marshlands and wetlands (1950s-1970s), as a reaction to the 
outward-inward agricultural process at the right bank.  
 
At this point, it is worth mentioning that the focus of the present research is on the developments of 
rice and irrigation agriculture, and the protection-for-conservation race of the remaining Doñana 
marshlands, at the right bank. Rice agriculture developed over both banks of the estuary, in particular, 
over three of the main islands that the river formed in the estuary (northern part of Isla Mayor and 
Isla Mínima, right bank; Isla Menor, left bank) and the northern part of the area known as Low 
Guadalquivir (left bank). However, the whole left bank has followed a divergent historical trajectory 
producing a distinct outcome, which requires a different normative treatment that is not dealt with in 
this research. 
 
Link 2 
 
From the second half of the 19th century until 1937, the constitutional-level institutional matrix 
steadily provided massive increasing returns through top-down processes. In particular, it provided 
the lands surrounding the marshlands with exchange value and potential for diversification, as well 
as collective-action actors with easy access to – or even direct transference of – property rights, and 
financial incentives to develop infrastructure (Table A2.1, Appendix 2). Until the 1980s, such matrix 
continued to incentivize, at a larger scale, the mobilization of actors downstream, through the 
promotion of on-the-ground investments for the full transformation and agricultural exploitation of 
the marshlands (Table A2.1, Appendix 2). 
Link 3 
 
During the self-reinforcement phase, certain political and power factors at the constitutional level 
played a key role in decreasing the attractiveness of alternative courses of action. According to 
Méndez et al. (2012) these factors include the increasing interventionism and bureaucratization of the 
authoritarian and autarchic government, and the action of the powerful technocratic corps of the State 
(mainly the forest and civil engineer corps). Regarding the latter, they refer, for example, to: coercive 
changes in property arrangements; the exclusion of “unproductive” marshland from nature 
conservation legislation; the promotion of economic maximization schemes for forestry in the vicinity 
of the marshlands (e.g., legislation such as the Forest Heritage Acts of 1941 and 1957) and agriculture 
in their interior (e.g., strategies such as the Guadalquivir-FAO Project, Almonte-Marismas Plan); 
cooption mechanisms within the emergent wetland conservation institutional regime; and the 
replacement of change champions by old-school engineers (e.g., J.A. Valverde). Despite the existence 
of several ‘windows of opportunity’ and the occurrence of several water and environmental crises, 
these constitutional-level mechanisms, operating mainly at the end of the self-reinforcement phase, 
imposed a command-and-control, ‘inherent institutional logic’ that curtailed institutional 
reorganization and renewal. In other words, they led to institutional reproduction and continuity (i.e. 
output inertia), and, eventually, to the rigid outcome. 
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